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The involution 
of photography
andrew Fisher
As we settle further into the era of digital media and 
globalized visual culture, it might be tempting to think 
that photography holds no more than historical interest. 
Yet it continues to feature in debates with considerable 
significance for the present.1 The terms by which it 
was negotiated in the twentieth century – the print, 
the negative and the mechanical-optical apparatus, the 
affective experience of a moment stilled, and any truth 
that its rendering promises – have been technically and 
culturally displaced and expanded. New instabilities 
have become familiar and have distanced us from how 
photography was understood, even in the fairly recent 
past. The current historical conjuncture is marked by a 
widespread suspicion that existing theories – including 
those that turned, in the 1970s, to Marxism, feminist 
critique, semiotics or psychoanalysis so as to politicize 
and contest mainstream photographic culture – might 
no longer be adequate to photography’s contemporary 
situation. That photography still matters, however, can 
be evidenced, prosaically and contingently, by noting 
the increasing number of new scholarly journals and 
exhibitions devoted to its past, present and future in 
recent years.2 There is, in this – as Fred Ritchin is 
only the latest to note – a sense that the undoing of 
photography’s prior certainties constitutes an ending 
and an enlargement. The fate of photography provides 
an ‘expansive filter’ through which to chart the ‘chaos 
of possibilities that emerge and recede, back up and 
move forward, crisscrossing each other.’3 Expectations 
of the new and the old, the obsolete and as yet only 
anticipated, are thrown into temporal disarray as its 
openness to reformation gives the photographic past a 
futural slant.
One case in point is the photographic index. Pho-
tography has often been thought to produce indexes of 
things in a way that enables its ontological characteri-
zation. The idea is that the photographic index arises 
out of a strict relation the apparatus establishes with 
something that has to be in front of the camera in order 
for its image to be produced. However, the lack of 
motivation in this process tends also to indicate other 
(contextual and dialogic) meanings. As Blake Stimson 
and Robin Kelsey noted recently, photographic indexi-
cality is tendentious and has shifted ‘from scientific 
guarantee to social promise to myth’. They think of 
this history as foregrounding a ‘double indexicality’ in 
photography’s ‘peculiar pointing both outward to the 
world before the camera and inward to the photogra-
pher behind it.’4 In the wake of new media, this relation 
has shifted again. Whilst one might be sceptical of the 
ways in which indexicality has been used as a key to 
the definition of photography, it is striking that in some 
senses – at the very moment at which the mechanical-
optical apparatus guaranteeing its sense is eclipsed 
– the ontological purchase of the concept on theoriza-
tions of the photographic has only seemed to increase. 
Certainly, this marks recent controversies between 
those who want its apparent sudden obsolescence to 
renew indexicality for the task of capping photography 
off historically, and those who carry on using the 
term regardless of the ground shifting beneath them. 
Indexicality has come to act as a retrospective and 
comprehensive stand-in for a range of related terms 
(such as evidence and reference), which, at various 
stages in its history, served different ends in contests 
over photography’s character and meaning. This does 
not leave the present untouched. One might say that 
photography is undergoing an involution registered 
by the transformation of indexicality. The historically 
freighted and politically ambivalent ways in which this 
might unfold call for close scrutiny.
Three recent books adopt different approaches to 
understanding photography in this regard.* Michael 
Fried’s Why Photography Matters as Art as Never 
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Before is a grandiose attempt to interpret a mainstream 
tendency in post-1980s’ photographic art as the redemp-
tion of certain modernist values. In The Civil Contract 
of Photography Arielle Azoulay develops a novel 
account of photography’s conflicted and fundamentally 
social form, reframing its political imperatives in 
light of the ‘civil contract’ she takes to subtend the 
production and consumption of photographic images. 
There are significant points of relation between these 
two publications. One is the manner in which they deal 
with Barthes’s Camera Lucida. As many – not least 
Jacques Rancière in the previous issue of this journal 
– have noted, the pivotal influence of this text is 
marked by certain historical ironies.5 Barthes’s account 
of indexicality as an unmediated experience of the 
‘having-been’ of the photographed came just before the 
digital image began to destabilize its technical basis. 
Furthermore, the separation of photography’s powerful 
affects from a generic notion of visual culture – central 
to Barthes’s search for the essence of photography 
– is premissed on the rejection of different modalities 
of intentionality, notably, artfulness and art. Yet, it 
is in photographic art and its critical discourses that 
Camera Lucida has had most impact. 
The anthology Photography between Poetry and 
Politics: The Critical Position of the Photographic 
Medium in Contemporary Art sets out to evaluate 
photography’s abiding critical value through the exami-
nation of recent photographic art. Its framing contrast 
between poetry and politics is highly suggestive as a 
way of thinking the ‘chaos of possibilities’ that marks 
these spheres. While, for a number of reasons, the 
anthology disappoints, the critical articulation of this 
disappointment nonetheless enables one to think of 
Fried’s and Azoulay’s rather different claims on the 
past, present and future of photography as, in some 
ways, filling out the problematic terrain that the idea 
of Photography between Poetry and Politics aims to 
understand.
Epic dimensions
Since the 1970s, photography has become increasingly 
central to the critical discourses and institutions of art. 
A familiar way of narrating this is to note photogra-
phy’s importance for the conceptual art of the 1970s 
and the dovetailing of its influence with that of radical 
criticisms of photographic culture developed at around 
the same time. These factors paved the way for photog-
raphy’s widespread acceptance as art in the 1980s and 
provided it with a critical framework. Different forms 
of photographic art have thrived since this period. 
Some have explored material and organizational ques-
tions (appropriating found images, exploiting archival 
contexts). Others took on existing genres of photogra-
phy to investigate cultural formations of identity (as in 
Cindy Sherman’s film stills). Many (like the American 
‘pictures’ group) scrutinized the simulacral charac-
ter of photographic culture. Whilst there are some 
who have consistently worked in a documentary vein 
(such as Allan Sekula and Martha Rosler), the broad 
drift has been to problematize or reject photography 
as a realistic and documentary form. Significantly, 
this tendency has found often nuanced expression 
in elaborate photographic constructs that foreground 
their status as pictures and not documents, as in Jeff 
Wall’s lightboxes. Wall has come to act as a model 
for the characterization of a genre: the ‘photographic 
tableau’, which combines large scale with high produc-
tion values in the self-conscious design of photographs 
for the gallery wall and adopts modes of visual address 
that are more traditionally associated with paintings.6
In light of the proliferation of artistic uses of pho-
tography this prevalence of the photographic tableau 
provokes reconsideration of medium specificity. As the 
editors of Photography between Poetry and Politics 
ask in their introduction, ‘Does photography today 
have a hybrid or chameleonic character because it can 
be part of entirely different mixed-media works of art 
or should it be understood as a medium-specific, well-
defined way of making contemporary works of art?’ 
The photographic artwork’s mode of engagement with 
the social world is thus foregrounded by the collection’s 
framing contrast. In turn, Van Gelder and Westgeest 
distinguish between a ‘larger’ and ‘more narrow’ sense 
of the poetic that characterize this relation as itself a 
broadly conceived ‘political’ question:
The wider employment of the notion [of poetry] 
indicates an autonomous art, a photography that 
is foremostly engaged in art – or an artistic tradi-
tion – itself without so much aspiring to take up 
a socially engaged or critical position. The more 
specific reading of the term ‘poetry’ hints at an art 
which uses photography in order to create a visual 
imagery that is marked by its epic dimension and 
which is so politically freestanding that it becomes 
extremely difficult to understand how such images 
position themselves in the world at all. The photo-
tableau appears to be the example by excellence of 
such a more narrow interpretation of ‘poetic’ uses of 
photography today.
Both these senses of the poetic are modes of rela-
tive autonomy, which appear to delimit the means by 
which the photographic artwork might engage the 
social. The epic self-absorption of the tableau appears 
wanting here, because its elements seem to exhaust 
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their representational claim on external reality in the 
constitution of the work’s autonomy.7 This gestures 
towards a familiar modernist sense of the critical: the 
artwork’s auto-critical or self-reflexive constitution. 
But one must recall the force of the idea that even 
the most ‘freestanding’ photographic artwork cannot 
help but depict something. The brevity of the editors’ 
introduction does not allow further articulation of this 
idea, or of its alternatives. This task is taken up with 
varying degrees of interest and success by the nine 
contributions that make up the collection. 
These are organized into three sections. Sections 
one and two are mostly taken up with defences of 
specific practices in light of post-Greenbergian debates 
about medium specificity. Broadly speaking, the first 
is shaped by the influence of Rosalind Krauss and the 
second by Michael Fried. Famously, Krauss concep-
tualized art’s ‘expanded field’ in an early rejection 
of Greenberg’s medium-specific definition of the arts 
according to their material substrates, but later, in 
the 1990s, retreated from this expansion of art into 
a reconsideration of the notion of artistic medium.8 
Here, Westgeest’s discussion of the ‘changeability of 
photographs in multimedia art’, and Marsh’s account 
of the ‘spectral’ persistence of photography’s medium 
specificity, both trade on this equivocation, but remain 
within its terms. The crudely titled second section 
– ‘Processes of (Re)construction, (Re)production, and 
(Re)presentation in Photography, in Relation to Recep-
tion and Memory’ – features essays by Cliff Lauson and 
Susan Laxton which already look, by way of contrast, 
to Fried’s Why Photography Matters. Lauson, in par-
ticular, compares Wall’s digital construction Flooded 
Grave (1998–2000) with a sequence documenting Claes 
Oldenburg’s Placid Civil Monument (comprising fairly 
banal staged images that depict the artist and others 
watching a hole being dug and refilled in Central Park 
one afternoon in 1967). No doubt one could make a 
lot of the similarities and contrasts between the staged 
character of these works, the relative values evident 
in their production, and their singular and sequential 
forms, especially in light of Fried’s privileging of the 
tableau, which I will discuss further below, but such 
critical questions remain undeveloped here.
The final section goes a long way to make up for the 
shortcomings of the preceding two, and anticipates the 
kinds of issue discussed in Azoulay’s The Civil Con-
tract of Photography in interesting ways. Alexandra 
Moschovi gives a measured account of photography’s 
institutional successes since the 1980s, whilst Simon 
Faulkner and T.J. Demos discuss work produced in 
the context of the Israel–Palestine conflict. Faulkner 
(drawing on some of Azoulay’s previous publications) 
focuses on Israeli painter David Reeb’s appropriation 
of journalistic photographs by Miki Kratsman and 
Eldad Rafaeli. These photographs depicting the ‘tunnel 
war’ in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1996 aim 
at being explicitly ‘connotative’ so as to disrupt the 
assumption that press photographs are smoothly ‘deno-
tative’. The context is an analysis of the Oslo peace 
process and the way it ended in the enhancement of 
Israeli military control in the area. Reeb’s later use of 
these photographs is read as allowing ‘the extension 
of the connotations of the Tunnel War’ in examination 
of this. Demos discusses photographs by Ahlam Shibli 
and gives a critical defence of two of her documentary 
works, claiming that they problematize documentary 
form at the levels of its interpretation and institutional 
context by striking a nuanced critical and aesthetic 
balance.9 His reading centres on a familiar theme in 
documentary photography: the desire to make the 
invisible visible. The people depicted in these works 
are often obscured – ‘rarely do they appear uninter-
rupted or clearly legible’ – and Demos draws out of this 
an elegant account of the heterogeneity that character-
izes the works’ relation to the people they depict. He 
identifies ‘an antinomy … at the crux of her practice 
– to represent the unrecognised, but also to deny them 
representation’. As an engagement with the social world 
through the aesthetic and critical conditions of docu-
mentary form, this is explicitly oriented to avoid the 
monumentalizing aestheticism that haunts the tableau 
form. For Demos, Shibli articulates an alternative 
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aesthetic that evidences the ‘fundamental uncertainty 
of photographic meaning’, and strives neither to monu-
mentalize its objects nor to dismantle its ideological 
framing simply to cover it with another.
The photographic tableau and the 
belated redemption of modernist art
As various contributions to Photography between 
Poetry and Politics suggest, for good or ill, Michael 
Fried’s Why Photography Matters as Art as Never 
Before will feature significantly in coming debates 
about photographic art.10 It is an ambitious, much 
anticipated and problematic book that centres on a rela-
tively small number of contemporary artists. Among 
these, Jeff Wall is central. Earlier photographers do 
feature (Walker Evans, Paul Strand, Lee Friedlander, 
Stephen Shore, August Sander and Diane Arbus) but 
reference to these ‘pre-tableau’ figures serves mostly 
to illustrate the historical novelty and artistic value 
asserted of various works made after this watershed.
Fried is best known for his 1967 critique of mini-
malism in ‘Art and Objecthood’, which argued against 
the ‘theatricality’ of minimalist art and for modernist 
painting’s and sculpture’s ‘anti-theatricality’. Minimal-
ist works were ‘by definition incomplete without the 
experiencing subject’. Modernist works, in contrast, 
were anti-theatrical as they ‘took no notice of the 
beholder, who was left to come to terms with them … 
as best as he or she could’. Contemporary art is, for 
Fried, defined by the crisis induced by the relegation 
of anti-theatricality and he takes the photographic 
tableau to redeem this situation. The central claim 
is that such photography foregrounds and mediates a 
tension between its status as a discreet picture (that 
‘takes no notice of the beholder’) and what Fried 
calls its ‘to-be-seenness’ (its mode of self-reflexively 
confronting its audience). The central concepts used to 
articulate the argument he makes on this basis derive 
from his later art-historical work on eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century painting, which obliquely fills out 
his critique of minimalism.
Starting in the 1750s in France a new conception 
of painting came to the fore that required that the 
personages depicted in a canvas appear genuinely 
absorbed in whatever they were doing, thinking, 
and feeling, which also meant that they had to be 
wholly unaware of everything other than the objects 
of their absorption, including … the beholder stand-
ing in front of the painting. Any failure of absorp-
tion … was considered theatrical in the pejorative 
sense of the term and was regarded as an egregious 
fault.11
Modernist painting emerged in the nineteenth 
century with Manet, who attempted, according to 
Fried, ‘to make not just each painting as a whole but 
every bit of its surface – every brush stroke, so to 
speak – face the beholder as never before’. Manet’s 
‘crisis’ was that of absorption and his response was to 
acknowledge the ‘facingness’ of painting. Wall per-
forms a similar, historically reflexive, overcoming of 
the crisis of post-minimalism: ‘The new art photogra-
phy seeks to come to grips with the issue of beholding 
in ways that do not succumb to theatricality but which 
at the same time register the epochality of minimal-
ism/literalism’s intervention by an acknowledgement 
of to-be-seenness’. Fried thus commits himself to 
an account of photographic art that is anti-theatrical 
and self-conscious of its ‘to-be-seenness’. This is an 
uncomfortable combination, to say the least.
The book starts with three ‘beginnings’, the major 
function of which appears to be to sideline other dis-
courses on photographic art. First, Wall’s, Sherman’s 
and Hiroshi Sugimoto’s engagement with cinema in the 
1980s is formalized in the terminology of ‘absorption’ 
and ‘anti-theatricality’; a depoliticizing shift away from 
categories such as ‘spectatorship’, ‘distraction’ and 
‘fascination’ through which these engagements have, 
productively, tended to be read. An account of the 
emergence of the photographic tableau as a recasting 
of relations between artwork and ‘beholder’ provides 
a second frame. A third addresses ‘the problematizing 
of beholding in the context of voyeurism’ and appeals 
to literary sources: an anonymous French tale from 
1755 and a narrative by Yukio Mishima, The Temple 
of Dawn.12 Whilst this latter story of visually figured, 
restrained and tragic desire is highly suggestive, one 
can’t help but suspect that its explicit function here is 
to displace other accounts of spectatorship, with which 
Fried is unwilling to engage. The overall effect is that 
questions of desire and difference are displaced onto a 
formal aesthetic dyad of artwork and beholder.
His territory thus marked, Fried develops his argu-
ment through discussion of Wall with reference to 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein. His account of the photo-
graphic tableau as an exemplary form rests on the sin-
gularity of particular works, to the extent that he even 
analyses explicitly serial works in these terms. Indeed, 
it is in Fried’s account of Bernd and Hilla Becher’s 
seriality that his idea of photography overreaches 
itself and the relation between art and photography 
stretches to breaking point. Though it goes against 
the grain of Fried’s narrative, I think his strategy can 
be summarized as follows: to bracket the hybridity 
of photographic art, its relation to photography more 
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broadly conceived (and the relative diversity of the 
practices he discusses), between the emphatic singular-
ity of Wall’s pictorial tableau and the Bechers’ serially 
organized documents of industrial architecture. Whilst 
this attempt at containment might draw out some 
revealing truths regarding Wall’s photographs, it gains 
virtually no critical purchase on the Bechers’ project 
and leaves Fried’s claim on what might lie between 
these two poles insecure.
Wall’s concept of ‘near documentary’ photogra-
phy (staged images depicting events that seem as if 
they might have occurred without intervention) is 
read through Heidegger’s analysis of the practical 
engagements that structure being-in-the-world. Fried 
articulates this in terms of the ready-to-hand character 
of equipment and the manner in which – when practi-
cal involvements break down – Heidegger claims one 
might ‘encounter entities within-the-world purely in 
the way they look’.13 Appeal to the primordial and 
encompassing context of the worldhood of the world 
is used to generalize Fried’s art historically specific 
concept of absorption, ‘as if Heidegger in Being and 
Time develops philosophically an insight that had 
belonged to Western painting … for more than three 
centuries’. Photography’s ubiquity and its capacity to 
render anything are thus read as a mundane register 
of the (practical but inauthentic) ready-to-hand, leaving 
Fried’s art concept of photography to pick up the thread 
of more authentic modes of being-in-the-world. 
Wall’s balance of the presentation of absorptive 
figures in obviously staged pictures is exemplary here. 
The crux of the matter in this Heideggerian context is 
what is to be made of photography’s historical achieve-
ment of an art status. For Fried, this is clear: ‘the stage 
has been set … for certain photographers, Wall pre-
eminently, to work against the grain of photographic 
spatialization and world-deprivation – of its address 
to a subject who “looks explicitly” at the photograph 
and all it depicts.’ This champions Wall’s artistry in 
constructing a ‘shared world, inflected individually’. 
The formal balance of Wall’s pictures is compounded 
with their staging of the social world in this existential 
expansion of Fried’s art-historical terms. But what of 
the social ambition previously generally accepted as 
a key aspect of Wall’s formal constructions?14 What 
specificity might a viewer gain as a player in this 
game? A clue might be found on the other side, so 
to speak, of the beholder/artwork dyad and in the 
fact that, ending his Heideggerean exposition of one 
photograph by Wall – Untangling (1994), showing 
two workmen, one of whom is intent on the task of 
untangling a big knot of ropes – Fried comments that 
‘it is hard not to feel that the picture would be stronger 
if both men were absent’.
In the chapter ‘Barthes’ Punctum’ Fried reads 
Camera Lucida as an anti-theatrical tract. His inter-
pretation turns on the manner in which Barthes ties 
the phenomenology of photographic affect to the rejec-
tion of different modes of intentionality. Famously, 
the punctum is a relational concept that finds its 
locus, initially at least, in those striking elements of 
a photograph that might interrupt its conventional 
use. Such extraneous details 
are sneaked into the image 
by the camera despite, and 
not because of, the intent of 
the photographer, and there 
they stand, for Barthes, as 
a plenipotentiary of affec-
tive experience that prom-
ises transcendence over the 
instrumentalized form of 
mass culture. Fried exploits 
this layered critique of inten-
tionality in discussions of 
the poses adopted by young 
beachgoers in Dijkstra’s por-
traits and, most forcefully, 
in the account he gives of 
Thomas Demand’s recon-
structed archival photo-
graphs. These celebrated 
works are images of blank 
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paper reconstructions, photographed ‘straight’ and 
printed large. Demand’s perversely straight attenuation 
of the photographic index, for Fried, draws attention 
to the photographic as such, in so far as it suggests, 
but bars from view, the informative details that gave 
sense to the source images thus faithfully reproduced 
and simultaneously erased. For Fried, Demand’s work 
approaches an index of photography’s ability to index 
things, which is an interesting interpretation. But the 
claim that this is directly entwined with the author’s 
animus towards minimalism is not convincing; nor 
is the attempt to think these works in terms of the 
relation between anti-theatricality and to-be-seenness. 
With regard to the interpretation of Barthes, this 
removes the possibility of any lacerating encounter 
with a paradoxical temporal ecstasy spurred by some 
detail. The punctum remains limited to the critique of 
only one layer of intention and loses its metaphysical 
singularity. Fried’s Demand faces one with the bare 
demonstration of an indexicality that comes after the 
fact to stand, so to speak, before the fact.
The most problematic part of the book is the 
penultimate chapter devoted to reading the Bechers’ 
project through Hegel’s notions of ‘genuine’ and 
‘spurious’ infinity. This is not a bad idea, but in 
Fried’s articulation it remains limited by the concern 
for single autonomous pictures and their claim on art, 
rather than, as seems logical, expanding to engage with 
the multifaceted form of photography as such. The 
chapter is titled ‘“Good” versus “Bad” Objectivity’ and 
it sandwiches the Bechers between a photograph of a 
plank leant against a wall (James Welling, Lock, 1976) 
and one of the few photographs Wall has designated 
a ‘documentary’ image (Concrete Ball, 2003). Fried 
quotes himself from an earlier text on Welling (that, 
unsurprisingly, links Lock to ‘Art and Objecthood’) 
claiming the image is informed by ‘an interest in real 
as opposed to abstract literalness or even “good” as 
distinct from “bad” objecthood’.
The Bechers’ longstanding project documenting 
types of industrial architecture according to systema-
tized procedure and standardized modes of display 
is, perhaps, the most influential photographic project 
to have adopted seriality as its organizing principle. 
Whilst Fried’s focus is on seriality, his interpretation 
is oriented to understanding the Bechers’ multiple, 
gridded images as a kind of tableau. One can’t help 
but suspect that, for an argument so deeply invested in 
the essential singularity of the photographic artwork, 
seriality stands as a formal limit that threatens the 
dissolution of the singular into photography’s broader 
and more slippery entirety. There’s a sense in which 
Fried’s account of the Bechers is marked by an under-
tow of ironic indetermination, which informs the use 
he makes of Hegel’s good and bad infinities. As the 
Bechers said in a 1988 interview, which Fried quotes, 
they wanted to ‘complete the world of things’. To 
explain this, Fried links Hegel’s distinction between 
‘true’ and ‘spurious’ modes of infinity to his own 
notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ objectivity: 
What is at stake is … the problem Hegel inher-
ited from Kant, of how to specify the finitude or 
determinateness or (more simply) the individuality 
of objects in a way that does not simply contrast 
all the characteristics that a particular object alleg-
edly possesses with all other characteristics it does 
not – an endless task that is precisely what Hegel 
means by the ‘spurious infinite’. 
The distinction between ‘spurious’ and ‘true’ infini-
ties turns on the critical observation that determina-
tions of the being of some finite thing, which rely on 
external or transcendent factors, import indetermina-
cies that remain wholly abstract and other to the object 
and thus impose a ‘spurious’ horizon of infinity. A 
determinate object bears a ‘relation of itself to itself’ 
that is, in some sense, genuinely infinite.15 Fried seeks 
to establish a ‘genuine’ or ‘good’ infinity by carving 
a tableau out of the relationship between specific and 
generic elements encountered in the Bechers’ grids:
I understand the Bechers’ project as at bottom 
ontological in intent in ways that bear suggestive 
analogy to Hegel’s reflections in both Logics about 
objects and their finitude or determinateness. The 
individual objects on the Bechers’ ‘Typologies’ are 
finite in their specificity but … that finitude emerges 
as such … against a background of the true or 
‘genuine’ infinity of possibilities established by the 
types, families, groupings, and myriad industrial 
instances of all these that are the basis of their art. 
Implicitly linking this appropriation of Hegel’s 
‘genuine’ infinity to his earlier Heideggerean framing 
of Wall, Fried takes himself to have established the 
Bechers’ work as having a tableau form, in so far as 
their typology shows ‘what is missing from the world 
of things’, namely ‘its capacity for individuation as a 
world’. 
Jeff Wall’s Concrete Ball (a Vancouver street scene 
in the middle of which stands a plinth supporting the 
eponymous globe) is supposed to provide a singular 
parallel to the Bechers’ typologies. It is Fried’s third 
example of ‘good objecthood’, but it seems not to obey 
the conditions set for the tableau in its singular or 
serial forms, except for the fact that it is quite big. Just 
before Why Photography Matters ends with a return to 
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the narrative analogy between Wall and Mishima, one 
finds Fried – perhaps distracted by the chance, finally, 
to do away with minimalism – unravelling the threads 
of his own attempt to consolidate the significance of 
the tableau as an exemplary instance of resurgent mod-
ernism in photographic art. The sense of Fried’s claim 
on contemporary photography rests on the consistency 
and explanatory value of his interpretation of the 
photographic tableau as the belated redemption of his 
own idea of modernism. This is partial in its account 
of photographic art, not as compelling as the tenor of 
his prose would have one think, and blinkered in its 
address to other aspects of photography.
Citizens and spectators
Arielle Azoulay’s The Civil Contract of Photography 
presents an argument that cuts across and goes against 
the tendency championed by Fried, and takes up some 
of the issues broached in the final section of the Van 
Gelder and Westgeest collection. Her focus is predomi-
nantly on photojournalistic and documentary practices 
(though often these are mediated through examples of 
artistic appropriation). She seeks to refigure the under-
standing of photography in terms of critically oriented 
political philosophy. The argument is a synthesis of 
two approaches, dependent upon and directed towards 
one another. Though she doesn’t really put it in these 
terms, one can take the concept of ‘the civil contract 
of photography’ as the central term of a photographic 
ontology that conceives of it as a fundamentally socio-
historical form. Her manifest critical commitment 
to the close reading of particular images results in 
analyses that are oriented to testing out the general 
theoretical framework, but they are also compelled to 
deal with the gaps thus opened up between the particu-
lar and the general. Throughout, Azoulay repeats the 
demand that one needs to ‘watch’ photographs in order 
to make them ‘speak’. This is a slightly sloganistic way 
of condensing the lengthy and complex consideration 
she gives both particular images and photography as 
such. The point is that both registers present ethical 
demands and politically inflected possibilities for those 
that make, disseminate and use them. If, at times, these 
different levels of analysis don’t mesh entirely with 
each other, they do, nonetheless, project a promising 
synthetic framework that has the value of restaging 
familiar and divisive debates in a way that provokes 
one to think them afresh. However, it has to be noted 
that The Civil Contract of Photography is an overlong, 
meandering book. Its scale allows space for Azoulay to 
develop and consolidate her argument, but also many 
repetitions that distract from this task.
The central objects of analyses are: ‘two injured 
groups … female citizens in Israel and Palestinians 
living in the territories occupied by Israeli since 1967’. 
These distinct but overlapping groups are discussed 
in terms of the impaired status of their citizenry and 
the modes of exclusion and violence that shape this: 
the ‘partial’ or ‘non-’citizen’s exposure to conditions 
of ‘catastrophe’. The impairments that distinguish the 
two groups are specified as the social constraints 
imposed by the fear of rape and the facts of lives 
lived under conditions of permanent but ‘temporary’ 
emergency. These factors are examined under the 
following assumption, which is inspired by Agamben 
but sees itself as presenting a critical inflection of his 
political thought: ‘citizenship in any particular his-
torical situation cannot be understood without taking 
into account the noncitizens who make up part of the 
governed population and constitute a governed group 
with and alongside which the citizens are governed’. 
As Azoulay describes it:
We can, following Giorgio Agamben, renounce the 
concept of citizenship altogether as fatally compro-
mised by the exception of the noncitizens that it 
always entails and therefore seek to replace it, or, as 
I will argue, we can seek to rehabilitate the concept 
by overcoming the distinction between citizen and 
noncitizens and with it the state of exception that 
is its basis. To do so … we also will need to re-
habilitate the concept of a political community of 
the governed as the basis of politics in the coming 
age, not, as Agamben would have it, bare life.
Some of the richest and most convincing parts 
of Azoulay’s argument develop out of her readings 
of images that stand as testimony to such pressures, 
as, for instance, in her discussion of a photograph by 
Miki Kratsman, Migrant Worker, Tel Aviv, 1998, which 
shows a dead Palestinian man lying on the floor of a 
sandy ditch (see over).16 Kratsman’s artful deployment 
of lens distortion and point of view in this image 
– destined for publication in an Israeli newspaper 
– are oriented to aesthetic and public affect. Azoulay’s 
discussion centres on the length of time a Palestinian 
(as opposed to an Israeli) body might lie so exposed 
before the corpse is covered. The difference dramatizes 
a moral question about whether the photographer acted 
in an exploitative manner in taking the time to compose 
such an artful shot. Her answer nuances a familiar 
question asked of documentary images. The tension 
between displaying and covering up that one might – if 
informed – read out of this image formalizes a civil 
association by carrying over into the public sphere a 
grievance, which is, as Azoulay has it: ‘not that of the 
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photographed person, but 
of the photographed scene 
or event; the disposses-
sion of citizenship, which 
the photographic act has 
posited itself against. … 
Photography, at times, is 
the only civic refuge at the 
disposal of those robbed of 
citizenship.’ Here one finds 
a specific register of one of 
her major points: the poli-
tics, ethics and aesthetics 
of photography are not intrinsically separable as modes 
of attention and behaviour that correspond to different 
roles in the production and consumption of images 
(photographer, photographed and viewer or user). On 
the contrary, Azoulay posits a basic social relation that 
subtends each and every photographic situation or act 
that, in its generality and ubiquity, is the basis of the 
civil contract of photography. In this, already existing, 
‘community’ or ‘civil space’,
Anyone who addresses others through photographs 
or takes the position of a photograph’s addressee, 
even if she is a stateless person, who has ‘lost her 
right to have rights’, as in Arendt’s formulation, is 
nevertheless a citizen – a member in the citizenry of 
photography. The civil space of photography is open 
to her as well. That space is configured by what I 
call the civil contract of photography.
There is some equivocation, here and throughout, with 
regard to the generality of such claims. At times they 
seem to be premissed on and limited to certain kinds 
of photograph, documents of specific socio-political 
ills made to give the dispossessed visibility. Visibility, 
here, is a mode of airing grievances that signifies 
equitable civil association in potentia. At other times 
such claims are used to project the ontological form 
of photography. Contrary to historicist narratives of 
photography’s invention, for example, Azoulay devel-
ops a social narrative of how and when photography 
came into its own: 
Photography was invented at precisely the moment 
when the individual inventor lost the authority to 
determine the meaning of his invention. … Not only 
is the invention of photography the invention of a 
new encounter between people, but the invention 
of an encounter between people and the camera. 
Photography was invented at the moment when a 
space of plurality was initiated, at the moment when 
a large number of people … took hold of a camera 
and began using it as a means of producing images. 
The significance of the social history and meaning 
of photography is inflected by a range of theoretical 
linkages. For example, in an interesting passage that 
informs the argument significantly, Azoulay appeals to 
Hannah Arendt in order to refigure critically Barthes’ 
bare noematic claim on the photographic index: 
What every photograph says of its subject, that it 
‘was there,’ is at most a testimony to the moment of 
a photograph’s eventuation in which photographer, 
photographed and camera encountered one another. 
Even when this encounter occurs under the difficult 
conditions of distress or disaster … as a space of 
plurality and action, the act of photography and the 
photographs it produces might, at least potentially, 
restore it. In other words, although photography 
may appear to be a distinctive object of contempla-
tive life (vita contemplativa), a moment in which 
all movements have been eliminated, it is actually 
deeply embedded in the active life (vita activa); 
it attests to action and continues to take part in it, 
always engaged in an ongoing present that chal-
lenges the very distinction between contempla-
tion and action. The photograph always includes a 
supplement that makes it possible to say show that 
what ‘was there’ wasn’t there necessarily in that 
way. 
Whilst this might seem rather optimistic, it presents an 
interesting extension of Barthes’s noematic correlation 
of photographic affect and bare reference. His acedic 
version of contemplation is, here, dissolved in the con-
cretely social potential that a photograph has to testify, 
even if this remains unrealized. Azoulay develops this 
in terms of Arendt’s further distinction between labour, 
work and action to ‘characterize various forms of 
active, noncontemplative gazes’: first, those associated 
with identification and survival; second, intentionally 
directed modes of looking that seek to control what is 
visible; and, third, the civic form of the ‘singular gaze 
enabled by photography’. 
The major ethical inference Azoulay draws from 
the possible civil association photography enables is 
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expressed as a contract. This is an association that 
quite literally, if quietly, implies responsibilities that 
are sedimented in photographs and their uses. The 
general political inference drawn is that this contract 
establishes an already achieved form of ‘citizenship’ 
in the photographed world. Whilst, at times, this 
sounds rather weak in its general form, it is backed 
up by a couple of hundred pages of critically incisive 
analyses of highly politicized photographs. The idea 
of photographic citizenship also finds a credible, if 
wistful, form as a relief from the operations of power, 
which has an echo of Foucauldian micropolitics, but 
seems also to avoid the reductive temptations that dog 
photographic discourse in this vein: ‘photography is 
one of the distinctive practices by means of which indi-
viduals can establish a distance between themselves 
and power in order to observe its actions and to do so 
not as its subjects.’ 
The self-consciously problematic attempt to synthe-
size the political plight of Israeli women and Palestin-
ians living in occupied territories works at the level of 
Azoulay’s analyses of particular images. Unfortunately, 
it falls short of the more general promise that it might 
make theoretically concrete the relationships between 
geopolitically overlapping situations in a theory of pho-
tography’s social form. The large central chapter, ‘Has 
Anyone Ever Seen a Photograph of a Rape?’, relates a 
critical history of the representation of rape in public 
and political discourses, in documentary photography 
(largely as an absence) and in pornography. Azoulay 
charts feminist critical discourse on rape since the 1970s 
to examine changing ‘codes of knowledge’ constitutive 
of ‘what has been meant by “rape”’. Her astonishment 
at the absence of public (photographic) representations 
of rape informs the reading she gives of the debates 
about its political, social and cultural framing. The 
stark representational gap between the few graphic 
photographic documents Azoulay does find (a notori-
ous series of images depicting brutal sexual violence 
in Nanking during the Chinese–Japanese war in 1937 
is central) and the public service advertisements for 
official reports on sexual violence and anti-rape legis-
lation frames the discussion. The argument takes the 
reluctance to represent rape in a non-pornographic 
or instrumentalizing manner to be too easily and 
too often co-opted to other, spectacularizing and/or 
patronizing ends, and her account of these issues ends 
in an epilogue that discusses a photomontage by the 
Israeli artist Michal Heiman. This work superimposes 
the artist’s horrified face and camera on the body in 
Duchamp’s Etant Donnés, and stamps it with the phrase 
‘I was there’ (I Was There: No. 6, 2004). This shift into 
discussion of a polemical, appropriative artwork dem-
onstrates the paucity of representations of the subject, 
which Azoulay’s interpretation draws out critically. It 
also stands as an indicator of her often problematic 
recourse to artworks throughout the book. Heiman’s 
works are, with varying degrees of success, central to 
Azoulay’s attempt to link her general argument to the 
particular situations that it promises to illuminate. That 
such linkages seem far more compelling when played 
out through interpretation of photo-journalistic and 
documentary photographs is telling.
There is a significant Barthesian theme running 
through Azoulay’s philosophy of photography. One can 
read The Civil Contract of Photography, in part, as an 
attempt to socialize the modes of intersubjectivity that 
structure, but remain implicit in, Barthes’s singular 
metaphysics of photographic affect. In one passage, 
she picks up on the ‘other’ unpublished image that 
structures Camera Lucida (upon which few com-
mentators remark), the image of Jerome, Napoleon’s 
cousin, which Barthes tells us sparked his desire to 
find out what photography is. Few tend to question the 
affective relationship he claims for the more celebrated 
‘Winter Garden’ photograph of his mother as a child, 
whether or not they agree with Barthes’s theses on 
the essence of photography, because of the pathos that 
surrounds it and the issues of privacy that determine its 
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withdrawal from publicity. In her brief analysis of his 
introduction of the Jerome photograph, Azoulay posits 
a negotiation between reciprocal but asymmetrical 
gazes that returns Barthes’s influential first-person 
narrative to a discourse on the social form of pho-
tographic experience. The unmediated experience of 
the ‘having-been’ of the photographed actually entails 
a negotiation between projection and identification, 
judgement and desire. This, in light of her thesis of 
the civil contract of photography, is the basis for an 
inversion of Barthes’s move from the generality of a 
mathesis universalis of photography to the mathesis 
singularis of the photograph. Neither the photograph, 
nor its viewer, is ever alone in the sense that Barthes 
would have us think – and which Fried trades upon in 
justifying his thesis on photographic art.
Problems associated with art appear crucial in light 
of the imperative to rethink photograph. Given that, 
presently, past forms are entwined with the projection 
of future possibilities, the complex heritage of modern-
ism is significant, but only partially so. It would be 
unfortunate if photographic discourse allowed itself 
to be overcome by the desire to foreclose possibilities 
that might arise from this situation. If photography is 
undergoing an involution, registered in the concept of 
indexicality, the importance of photographic art and 
the socio-historical forms of its testimony, then, Azou-
lay’s attempt to theorize the openness and complexity 
of photographic form will prove helpful in scrutinizing 
the historically freighted and politically ambivalent 
ways in which its involution might unfold. Far more 
so than Fried’s efforts to the contrary.
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